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I. INTRODUCTION
Small businesses-having created 64% of net new American jobs in the
past fifteen years--are the engine of the American economy. During the
recent recession, however, small businesses have suffered disproportionate
job loss as the result of frozen credit markets among other factors.
This paper explores the role of small businesses in the U.S. economy
and the key effects of the post-2008 credit paradigm on U.S. small
businesses (see Section II). In exploring the lead up to the 2008 credit
frictions and its economic ripple effects, this study investigates the key
levers that stalled the traditional small business credit market through a
supply and demand analysis. This stall ultimately led to a peak to trough
loss of 3.7 million jobs2 and a 14.4% ($102.2 billion) drop in small
businesses lending.
3
Furthermore, using this same framework this study explores
government response to the frozen small business credit markets,
specifically through the lens of the U.S. Small Business Administration
(SBA) and two pieces of legislation--the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act of 20094 ("Recovery Act") and the Small Business Jobs
* David D. Chait is the Senior Policy Advisor in the Office of the Administrator at
the U.S. Small Business Administration. The views stated here are those of the
author and do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Small Business
Administration or its staff.
1 U.S. DEP'T LAB., BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., BUSINESS EMPLOYMENT DYNAMICS
1993-2009).
U.S. DEP'T LAB., BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., BusiNEss EMPLOYMENT DYNAMICS
(Q1 2007-Q1 2009), available at http://www.bls.gov/schedule/archives/
cewbd nr.htm.3 FDIC-CALL REPORT DATA (June 2008-March 2011). Small Business Loans
represent balance sheet loans outstanding less than $1 million. March 2011
represents current trough, however the total loans outstanding continue to decline.
4 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat.
115 (2009).
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Act of 20105 (Jobs Act) (see Section III). Through these targeted
government responses, SBA loan guarantees supported $42 billion in
lending.
Finally, to understand best practices from the recession for a
government response to a credit crisis, this paper examines the relative
importance of key credit market factors on small business lending (see
Section IV). Using time-series data, this paper seeks the best-fit model for
small business lending by examining lender volume capacity (e.g.,
capitalization), lender distribution capacity (e.g., points of access) and
borrower capacity (e.g., collateral). This study ultimately uncovers
capitalization to be a vital gating issue, and both distribution capacity and
borrower capacity (assuming constant demand) to have greater direct
impact on lending. Thus, recognizing the levers available to government,
increased points of access to support small business lending in government
programs, in tandem with other efforts, are of paramount concern.
II. SMALL BUSiNESS & THE U.S. ECONOMY
Small businesses6 are the engine of the U.S. economy and touch a
majority of Americans on a daily basis. According to the U.S. Census
Bureau there are 27 million small businesses (firms), which represents
99.93% of all firms and 99.79% of all employer firms. Furthermore, small
businesses employ half of the American workforce (59.6 million
Americans, with a payroll of $2.2 trillion).8 Even more essential to the
economy, small businesses are the driver of employment growth-having
created 65% of all net new jobs (9.8 million jobs) from 1993 to 2009. 9
Much of this is driven by the firm dynamics cycle of firm startups,
expansions, contractions and deaths. As such, new firm creation is essential
5 Small Business Jobs Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-240, 124 Stat. 2504.
6 Note: The definition of Small Business can vary by source or federal agency. For
the purposes of this paper, Small Businesses will be defined as all firms with 500
employees or less. The U.S. Small Business Administration defines a small
business: Congress defined small businesses as those that are: (1) independently
owned and operated; (2) not dominant in their field of operation; and (3) under a
certain size. Am I a Small Business Concern?, U.S. SMALL BUSINESS ADMIN.,
http://www.sba.gov/content/am-i-small-business-concem (last visited Oct. 23,
2011). These size standards vary by industry code for firm revenues, owner net
worth and number of employees. Id.
7 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, TABLE 2A: EMPLOYMENT SIZE OF EMPLOYER AND
NONEMPLOYER FIRMS (2008), http://www.census.gov/econ/smallbus.html.8 Id.
9 U.S. DEP'T LAB., supra note 1.
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to the economy and many of these start-up businesses are the high-growth
"gazelles."' 0
Figure 1. New Business Starts
Number of Establishments less than 1 year old, March 1994 -
March 2010
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Source: BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., Bus.INEss EMP. DYNAMICS, Entrepreneurship and the US.
Economy, http://www.bls.gov/bdm/entrepreneurship/bdm_chartl.htm (last visited Sept. 25,
2011).
A. The Credit Crunch of 2008
The basic cycle of financial crises is that credit is cheap
and easy to get for a time. Banks relax their standards too
much, leading to excess lending and leverage. When the
credit crisis hits, they slam on the brakes and shift into
reverse. Banks pull back, not just from those companies
that are more at risk of failure, but from all companies."
- Timothy Geithner, US. Secretary of Treasury
As the largest creator of jobs in the economy, small businesses are also
acutely affected by changes to the economic environment, as evidenced by
the credit crunch of 2008. From the first quarter of 2007 through the first
quarter of 2009, small businesses shed 3.7 million jobs. This represents
10 "Gazelles" can be defined as high-impact firms that exhibit both relatively high
employment and revenue growth for their particular industry. ZOLTAN ACS,
WILLIAM PARSONS & SPENCER TRACY, SBA OFFICE OF ADVOCACY, HIGH-IMPACT
FIRMS: GAZELLES REVISITED 1 (June 2008).
11 Timothy Geithner, U.S. Sec. Treasury, Opening Remarks at Small Business
Conference (Nov. 18, 2009), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-
center/press-releases/Pages/tg412.aspx.
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64% of all jobs lost over that period, with medium and larger firms
shedding two million jobs. Even before the consequences on the broader
economy became evident, small business were among the first to see the
effects of this economic crisis. In the third and fourth quarters of 2007,
small businesses saw a net loss of 141,000 jobs while larger businesses
gained a net 136,000 jobs.' 2
Figure 2. U.S. Employment by firm size
Qtarterly net change in emp oy-nent by firm size class, 012006-033 2010
Seasonally adjusted, thousaids
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Source: BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., Bus. EMP. DYNAMICS, Quarterly Net Change by
Firm Size Class, Seasonally Adjusted, http://www.bls.gov/web/cewbd/tablee.txt
(last visited Sept. 25, 2011).
Much of this can be contributed to a slowing of the number of new
business starts. These new businesses represent both high-growth
"gazelles" which will grow to be the largest job creators, as well as Main
Street (i.e., non-traded) small businesses, which are an important part of
12 DEP'T. LAB., BUREAU OF LAB. STAT. BUSINESS EMPLOYMENT DYNAMICS:
FOURTH QUARTER 2007, available at http://www.bls.gov/schedule/archives/
cewbd nr.htm.
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chum dynamics. Without such replacement dynamics, the overall stock of
these important Main Street firms would decline. In fact, the number of new
private sector establishments in 2010 of 505,000 was 18.8% lower than the
previous ten year average of about 620,000 (See Figure 1, supra).1
3
B. Causes of the credit crunch
This persistent decline in small business employment begs the question
of causes, many of which can be attributed to a severely constrained credit
market in which about 60% of small businesses reported they could not
access the credit they needed. 14
It is generally agreed that the immediate cause of the credit crunch
stemmed from a sharp increase in U.S. subprime mortgage defaults, 15 first
spiking in February 2007.16 From 1996 to 2006, subprime mortgages
increased from 9.5% to 23.5% of all mortgage originations, valued at $600
billion. 17 Much of this was fueled by lower interest rates-the bank Prime
loan rate dropped from an average of 9.23% in 2000 to 4.12% in 2003.18
This was followed by a period of easing lender credit standards from
October 2003 until October 2006.19
As noted in the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission Report,
homeownership reached an all-time high of 69.2% in 2004,20 while housing
values increased rapidly by more than 105% between January 2000 and
13 James Manyika et al., An Economy That Works: Job Creation and America's
Future, MCKINSEY GLOBAL INSTITUTE, 16-17 (June 2011), available at
http://www.mckinsey.com/mgi/publications/usjobs/index.asp.
14 William C. Dunkelberg & Holly Wade, NFIB Small Business Economic Trends,
NFIB RES. FOUND., 15 (Oct. 2009), available at www.nfib.com/portals/0/pdf/sbet/
sbet2OlOl2.pdf.
15 Four general mortgage categories exist in the United States, broadly defined as
prime, jumbo, Alt-A, and subprime. Generally speaking, a subprime loan typically
serves borrowers unable to access the other, more conventional mortgage types.
Consequently, subprime borrowers pay a higher cost of capital. In many instances
the rate of repayment is adjustable.
16 Paul Mizen, The Credit Crunch of 2007-2008: A Discussion of the Background,
Market Reactions, and Policy Responses, FED. RES. BANK OF ST. LOUIS REv., 531,
533 (Sept./Oct. 2008), available at
research.stlouisfed.org/publications/review/08/09/Mizen.pdf.
17 Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, Final Report of the National Commission
on the Causes of the Financial and Economic Crisis in the United States, THE FIN.
CRISIS INQUIRY REP. 70 (Jan. 2011), available at www.fdlp.gov/component/
content/article/42.../884-fcic-report.
18 Monthly Bank Prime Loan Rate, FED. RES. BANK OF ST. LouIs, http://research.
stlouisfed.org/fred2.
19 Net Percent of Domestic Respondents Tightening Standards for Commercial and
Industrial Loans Small Firms, FED. RES. BANK OF ST. LOUIS, http://research.
stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/DRTSCIS?cid=32239.20 THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 17, at 34.
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April 2006.21 However, an increase in subprime defaults, specifically
among adjustable rate mortgages, and a decrease in housing values created
a vicious cycle that fueled both trends. By 2007 one in five subprime
adjustable rate mortgages were in serious delinquency (ninety or more days
overdue).22 This figure would rise to 40% in 2009.23
During this period of subprime growth, there was also an increase in the
securitization of loans, specifically collateralized debt obligations (CDOs),
which serve as a means of pooling risk. In fact, in 2007, subprime securities
issued exceeded the value of the underlying mortgages for the year.24 These
mortgages were essentially pooled with other loan types, packaged into
tranches, and sold based on the risk of the underlying assets (and the
commensurate interest rate paid). Additionally, a market for insurance
products against CDOs, known as credit default swaps (CDSs) grew-
estimated between $45 and $62 trillion in 2007.25 However, as noted by a
2008 St. Louis Federal Reserve paper:
Policymakers, regulators, markets, and the public began to
realize that subprime mortgages were very high-risk
instruments when default rates mounted in 2006. It soon
became apparent that the risks were not necessarily reduced
by pooling the products into securitized assets because the
defaults were positively correlated. This position worsened
because subprime mortgage investors concentrated the
risks by leveraging their positions with borrowed funds,
which themselves were funded with short-term loans.
Leverage of 20:1 transforms a 5 percent realized loss into a
100 percent loss of initial capital.26
Overall, the exposure to these products extended deep into the financial
system, leading to fundamental changes in the entire market as defaults
grew. This ultimately led to hundreds of billions in write downs (or the
reclassification of asset values) from large financial institutions.27 And as
lenders and exposed financial firms lacked adequate capital, market factors
caused an acute drop in U.S. equities. This led to the bankruptcy or sale of
several large private financial institutions including Bear Steams, Merrill
Lynch, Countrywide Financial, and Lehman Brothers, as well as
21 "The S&P Case-Shiller Home Price Index" is an index of housing values for a
composite often or twenty Metropolitan Statistical Areas; the above data utilized
the Composite 20 Index and is seasonally adjusted (January 2000 = 100.59).
22 THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 17, at 216-217.
23 Id.
24 Id. at 70.
25 Markus K. Brunnermeier, Deciphering the Liquidity and Credit Crunch 2007-
2008, 23 J. OF ECON. PERSP. 77, 79 (2009).
26 Mizen, supra note 16, at 531, 539.
27 Brunnermeier, supra note 25 at 77, 86.
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government intervention to support, among others, insurer American
International Group.
The overall causes and symptoms of the 2008 credit crunch cannot
aptly be summarized in this sub-section. Myriad other factors including
accounting mechanisms (e.g., repos), regulation, effects on the Commercial
Paper Market and countless others played a pivotal role in creating a new
credit paradigm in 2008. Nonetheless, for the purposes of this study, which
focuses on the consequences for small business and necessary remedies, the
key takeaway is that small businesses faced a new world in 2008 with
increasing cost of capital as well as tightening credit standards, coupled
with decreased housing values and uncertain sales.
C. The New Credit Paradigm
This new economic reality affected the small businesses credit market
in four distinct ways:
Figure 3. Credit Market Effects
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bank write-offs totaled more than $1.8 trillion.28 At the same time, banks
were faced with additional calls on their existing capital, led by a surge in
delinquencies and eventual charge-offs. From March 2006 to March 2010,
the overall charge-off rate on loans outstanding increased from 0.35% to a
peak of 3.12% and the number of delinquencies increased by over 500%. At
the same time regulators required lenders to hold higher amounts of capital
against mounting defaults.
igure 4. Charge Off Rate and number of Definquencies
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Source: Charge off and Delinquency Rates on Loans and Leases at Commercial Banks, FED.
REs. BOARD, http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/chargeoff/(last visited Sept. 25, 2011).
B. Tightened Credit Standards
During this period, and interlinked with volume capacity, small
businesses also saw bank credit standards tighten significantly. According
to the Federal Reserve Senior Loan Officer Survey, small business credit
standards tightened for thirteen straight quarters starting in the first quarter
of 2007. During this same period credit standards for larger businesses only
tightened for ten quarters, with standards easing much sooner as well.
28 The Small Business Economy 2010: A Report to the President, U.S. SMALL Bus.
ADMIN., 3 (2010), available at www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/sb-econ200.pdf.
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Figure 5. Small Business Credit Standards
Net loosening of small business credit standards, Q1 2007 - Q2 2011
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Source: Survey of Senior Loan Officers, Figure 1: Measures of Supply and Demand for C&I
Loans, FED RES. BoARD (July 2011),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/snloansurvey/201108/chartdata.htm
1. Demand Constraints
On the demand side, small businesses lending was affected by two key
factors. Firstly, there was an actual decrease in demand for capital itself as
sales plummeted and uncertainty rose. On the other hand, for those who
actually sought credit, many suffered from decreased creditworthiness due
to a decrease in available collateral.
A. Decreased Demand forfinancingfrom small businesses
According to the U.S. Census Department monthly estimates of retail
and food services sales, total retail and food sales grew on average by 5.5%
from 1992 to 2008, including annualized growth of 5.9% during the
recessionary period of 2001 .29 However, sales decreased by 9.2% from
2008 to 2009 to $312 billion.30 Consequently, a cohort of small businesses
29 Estimates of Monthly Retail and Food Services Sales by Kind of Business: 1992-
2011, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (September 14, 2011), http://www.census.gov/retail/.
Estimates are shown in millions of dollars and are based on data from the Monthly
Retail Trade Survey, Annual Retail Trade Survey, and administrative records.3 0 d
2011
not 9.0%
I 49.2%
'4.5%
13.5%
0.0%
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decreased their capital needs and did not apply for credit. The National
Federation of Independent Businesses (NFIB), which surveys its small
businesses members, found that in 2009 only 55% of small businesses
attempted to borrow funds.3' This figure further declined to 48% in 2010.32
Additionally, the Federal Reserve Board Survey of Senior Loan Officers
33
indicates seventeen straight quarters of net weakened demand from small
businesses for commercial and industrial loans.34
This shift is also apparent in decreased consumer sentiment, which can
often be used as a gauge of small business plans for expansion (or lack
thereof). From January 2007 to March 2009 the NFIB Index of Small
Business Optimism lost 18.1% of its value, and reached a low score of
81 .0.35 Even more drastic, the Discover Small Business Watch Survey of
Economic Confidence lost 40.1% of its value from January 2007 to
36November 2008, reaching a low score of 67.5. An additional subset of
small businesses did not seek credit out of fear and/or the assumption that
they would not be provided credit. According to the NFIB, 11% of those
who did not attempt to borrow were these "discouraged borrowers."37 It
should be noted, however, that the scale of this decline in small business
credit demand is debated.
31 William J. Dennis, Jr., Small Business Credit in a Deep Recession, NFIB
RESEARCH FOUND. (Feb. 2010).
32 Press Release, National Federation of Independent Business, Small Businesses'
Demand for Credit Fell for a Second Consecutive Year (Feb. 2, 2011),
h'ttp://www.nfib.com/press-media/press-media-item?cmsid=55892.
3It should be noted that the Senior Loan Officer Survey only captures demand for
"funds actually disbursed as opposed to requests for new or increased line of
credit." The July 2010 Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey on Bank Lending
Practices, BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., DIVISION OF
MONETARY AFFAIRS 59 (2010), available at http://federaireserve.gov/boarddocs/
snloansurvey/201008/fullreport.pdf Going forward, demand-side data that captures
borrower applications will be collected by the new Consumer Finance Protection
Bureau under required data collection provisions in the Dodd Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1071, 124 Stat. 2056
20 10).
4 Net Percentage of Domestic Respondents Reporting Stronger Demand for
Commercial and Industrial Loans Small Firms (DRSDCIS), BOARD OF
GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS. (2011), available at http://research.
stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/DRSDCIS?cid=32239.
35 William C. Dunkleberg & Holly Wade, NFIB SMALL Bus. ECONOMIC TRENDS 4
20 11), available at http://www.nfib.com/Portals/0/PDF/sbet/sbet201108.pdf.
6 Press Release, Discover Financial Services, Discover Small Business Watch:
Small Business Economic Confidence Continues to Fall (Jan. 29, 2007), available
at http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public content/business/indexes/
discover small business watch/small business economic confidence reboundsi
n_january; Press Release, Discover Financial Services, Discover Small Business
Watch: Small Business Economic Confidence Continues to Fall (Nov. 24, 2008),
available at http://www.rasmussenreports.com/publiccontent/business/indexes/
discover small business watch/discover r small-business watch sm small busi
ness economic-confidence continues to fall.
7 Dennis, supra note 3 1, at 10.
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2. Diminished Creditworthiness
Additionally, many small businesses found themselves lacking not only
an appropriate credit score (as defined by the new credit standard
paradigm), but also without necessary collateral given the downturn in the
housing market. According to the S&P/Case-Shiller Home Price Index,3 8
housing values rose 105.3% from January 2000 to April 2006; however,
values declined rapidly by 31.8% from April 2006 to May 2009.
Furthermore, according to the National Federation of Independent
Businesses (NFIB) and Gallup, approximately 16% of small businesses
indicated borrowing against their homes for business purposes and 7%
reported using their homes as direct collateral.39 Leveraging this same data
and a Barlow Survey, researchers from the Cleveland Federal Reserve
found that of the $31.5 billion decline in home equity loans since 2007-
$7.9 billion of that translates into lost small business credit.40
3. Effects on Small Business Financing
In total, the frictions created by diminished capital availability,
tightening credit standards, decreased demand for capital and a decline in
available collateral, led to a stalling of the credit markets. Specifically, the
market for small business financing dried up. The best proxy for aggregate
small business credit data is FDIC Call Report data. "Small business loans"
are defined as outstanding loans (e.g., on balance sheet) of less than $1
million. This definition includes:
a) Loans secured by non-farm, non-residential properties of less
than $1 million held in domestic offices, as well as
b) Commercial and industrial loans (C&I) of less than $1 million
held in domestic offices on outstanding loans under $1 million.
From June 2006 to June 2008, lending to small businesses increased by
12.2%, or $77.3 billion, to $711.5 billion in loans outstanding. However,
starting June 2008, loans under $1 million outstanding began a precipitous
decline, falling by 14.4% or $102.2 billion to $609.3 billion in March
201 1.
4 1
Furthermore, the Congressional Oversight Panel, formerly chaired by
Elizabeth Warren, reported in 2010 that between 2008 and 2009 small
38 See supra note 21.
39 Mark E. Schweitzer & Scott A. Shane, The Effect of Falling Home Prices on
Small Business Borrowing, FED. RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND (Dec. 20, 2010),
http://www.clevelandfed.org/research/commentary/2010/2010-18.cfm.
40 Id.
41 FDIC CALL REPORT DATA, supra note 3.
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business loan portfolios from banks receiving TARP funds fell by 9%,
which is more than double the 4.1% drop in their overall portfolios.
42
Figure 6. Small Business Lending
Outstanding loans less than $1 million, June 2006 - March 2011
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Source: FDIC CALL REPORT DATA, supra note 3.
Note: Data is annual through March 2010; quarterly thereafter.
This decline in small business lending was even sharper among small
dollar loans below $100,000, which historically comprise 88% of small
business lending by number of loans (1995-2010). The majority of the
$102.2 billion (or 14.4% percent) decline in small business loans from June
2008 to March 2011 came from these small dollar loans.
a) By Volume. During this period, outstanding loans less than
$100,000 decreased by 18.1% or $30.8 billion and outstanding
loans between $100,000 and $250,000 decreased by 16.8% or
$21.1 billion. Conversely, outstanding loans between $250,000
and $1 million, though decreasing by $50.3 billion, decreased
by a smaller 12.1%.
b) By Number. During this period total small business loans
decreased in number by 5.98 million loans or 22%. Ninety-five
42 CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, MAY OVERSIGHT REPORT: THE SMALL BUSINESS
CREDIT CRUNCH AND THE IMPACT OF THE TARP, 51 (2010), available at
www. gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CPR T. ../pdf/CPR T- I 1JPR T5 6095.pdf
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percent of this loss (5.69 million loans) was from loans below
$100,000, which translates to 22.8% decline.
This data is particularly of note since small dollar loans are often
correlated with loans to historically underserved communities. According to
a January 2010 study by the Minority Business Development Agency
(MBDA), minority firms typically receive lower dollar loan amounts than
non-minority firms. Between 1997 and 2002, the average loan amount for a
high sales minority firm was $149,000 versus $310,000 for high-sales, non-
minority firms, which is more than double.43
This situation not only impacted the overall credit market, but the SBA
loan guarantee program, as well. From October 2008 to January 2009, SBA
7(a) and 504 loans declined by 45% from a fiscal 2008 monthly gross
average of $1.5 billion to $830 million in 2009(see section 3.1 for further
discussion).44
D. Alternate Sources of Financing
Small businesses are also more reliant on traditional credit than other
sources. According to the Federal Reserve, over 80% of small businesses
use credit cards as a means of capital-64% using small business cards.45
And a 2009 study by the National Small Business Association (NSBA)
showed that 34% of small businesses reported financing over a quarter of
their operations through credit cards.46 Nonetheless, during the decline in
small business access to traditional credit, additional sources of non-
traditional and higher-cost credit, such as credit cards or home equity lines,
also evaporated. Additionally, many small businesses reported sudden
changes to their terms-63% reported increased interest rates, 41% reported
reduced credit limits, and 25% reported being switched from fixed to
variable interest rates without consent.47
43 Robert W. Fairlie & Alicia M. Robb, Disparities in Capital Access Between
Minority and Non-Minority-Owned Businesses: The Troubling Reality of Capital
Limitations Faced by MBEs, U.S. DEP'T OF COM., MINORITY Bus. DEV. AGENCY
35 (2010).
44 May Oversight Report: The Small Business Credit Crunch and the Impact of the
TARP, supra note 42, at 34.
45 Report to the Congress on the Use of Credit Cards by Small Businesses and the
Credit Card Market for Small Businesses, BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED.
RESERVE Sys., 28 (2010).
46 2009 Small Business Credit Card Survey, NAT'L SMALL Bus. ASS'N (NSBA), 4
2009), available at www.nsba.biz/docs/09CCSurvey.pdf.
7 Many of these practices will be banned under new rules proposed by the Dodd-
Frank Act.
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III. GOVERNMENT RESPONSE
The effects of the 2008 credit crunch created a vicious cycle and
frictions that stalled the U.S. credit markets-thus, prompting an
intervention from the new administration of President Barack Obama in
January 2009 to resurrect the American credit market.48 Specifically,
actions taken by the SBA between January 2009 and September 2010 were
focused on reviving the U.S. credit markets for small businesses in the same
four areas identified in Figure 3 as affected by the new post-2008 credit
paradigm.
Through the Recovery Act in 2009 and the Jobs Act in 2010, the SBA
provided small businesses much needed access to capital. Overall, the SBA
guaranteed over $42 billion of capital in Recovery Act and Jobs Act
supported loans.
48 Note: Prior to intervention by the Obama Administration and the new Congress
in February 2009, many actions were taken by the Bush Administration and
Congress to address the credit crisis including the Troubled Asset Relief Program
(TARP) in October 2008. Additionally, the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan
Facility (TALF) program was first announced by the Federal Reserve in November
2008.
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Figure 7. SBA Small Business Lending Volume49
SBA 7(a)/504 Loan Volume, October 2006 - June 2011
Monthly Loan Volume by Gross Dollar(thousands)
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Source: US. Small Business Administration
A. The U.S. Small Business Administration
The SBA was founded by Congress in July 1953 and was advocated for
by President Dwight Eisenhower out of the legacy of President Herbert
Hoover's Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC), the Smaller War
Plants Corporation (SWPC) founded in 1942 to support small business
contracts in World War II and the Small Defense Plants Administration
(SDPA) from the Korean War, as well as the Commerce Department's
Office of Small Business (OSB).50 The SBA was officially established by
Congress on July 30, 1953 through the passage of the Small Business Act
of 1953."'
The mission of the SBA has always been to serve as the chief advocate
for small businesses and to provide them support in four key areas: small
business access to capital, access to government procurement contracts,
49 Note: Evident volatility/spikes in SBA 7(a)/504 volume beginning in late 2009
were largely driven by impending expiration of authority or funds for various
provisions of the Recovery Act. The large spike in December 2010 was caused by
the impending expiration of authority and funds for the Jobs Act provisions.
50 Our History, U.S. SMALL Bus. ADMIN., http://www.sba.gov/about-sba-
services/our-history (last visited Sept. 11, 2011) [hereinafter U.S. Small Bus.
Admin.].51 Small Business Act of 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-163, 67 Stat. 230 (1953).
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providing management and technical assistance, as well as providing loans
to disaster victims (personal or business).52 The type and nature of these
services have changed and grown over the years, buttressed by
administrative changes, as well as congressional mandates, including the
Small Business Investment Act of 1958 53 and the Small Business Jobs Act
of 2010. Although all of the offices of the SBA are interconnected and now
include an Office of Investment, International Trade, and others, for the
purposes of this study, the focus will be exclusively on SBA's traditional
credit (lending) programs.
With the exception of loans to support victims of disasters, the SBA
does not provide direct loans to support small businesses or act as a bank.
Instead, it supports access to capital through loan guarantees to lenders that
provide capital to small businesses, as well as by providing capital to
intermediaries to provide subsequent funds to small businesses. These
intermediary relationships range from providing grants and loans to
microloan intermediaries to debenture financing for private equity and
venture capital funds through the Small Business Investment Company
(SBIC) program. 54
As such, SBA's loan guaranty programs most directly fill a gap in the
abovementioned traditional credit market in supporting commercial and
industrial loans. SBA loan guaranty programs can generally be bucketed
into two broad categories: the sections of the Small Business Act of 1953 in
the case of the 7(a) program and the Small Business Investment Act of
1958 for the Section 504 program. They are granted authority from:
* 7(a) Loan Program: The 7(a) loan is a multi-purpose loan
guarantee program that can provide small businesses with real
estate, equipment, working capital or expansion capital. In
general, the 7(a) program can guarantee loans up to $5 million
with a 75% guarantee to lenders for loans greater than
$150,000 (and 85% for loans below).55
* 504 Program: The 504 loan program provides small
businesses long term financing for fixed assets such as
commercial real estate or equipment. A 504 loan is structured
with a private lender, taking a senior lien and 50% of project
costs, a non-profit Certified Development Company (CDC)
52 See Our History, supra note 50.
" Pub. L. No. 85-699, 72 Stat. 102 (1958).
54 See What SBA Offers to Help Small Businesses Grow, U.S. SMALL Bus. ADMIN.,
http://www.sba.gov/content/what-sba-offers-help-small-businesses-grow (last
visited Sept. 11, 2011).55 Loan Program Quick Reference Guide, U.S. SMALL Bus. ADMIN.,
http://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/files/LoanChartHQ20110728.pdf (last visited
Sept. 13, 2011).
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covering 40% of the cost, and the borrower contributing 10%
equity. The SBA guarantees 100% of the CDC position.
5 6
B. Credit Response
The biggest challenge facing small businesses right now is
that too many good, creditworthy borrowers still can't find
the capital they need to grow and create jobs . . . . Big
business can tap into other sources of capital. But small
businesses rely heavily on bank credit to start, sustain, and
grow their business. That's why they're still hard-hit by
this credit crunch. Today's goal is to make sure small
businesses can get adequate financing in order to lead us
out of this recession-as they have in the past.
57
- Karen G. Mills, Administrator of the
U.S. Small Business Administration
Recognizing the frictions that stalled the U.S. small business credit
market, and recognizing SBA loan guaranties as a proxy for the health of
the overall market, the SBA, Congress, and the new Obama Administration
sought to unlock the market. Specifically, actions taken to support the
markets recognized the key aforementioned constraints and developed
solutions within that framework.
1. Limited capital availability at financial institutions
In addressing the issue of capital availability at financial institutions,
the Recovery Act and the Jobs Act increased the government guaranty on
loans from the typical 75% to 90%. Additional Administration programs
from the Jobs Act to support bank capital constraints included the Treasury
Department led Small Business Lending Fund, which will provide up to
$30 billion in relatively cheap Tier 1 capital to banks with assets less than
$10 billion,58 and the State Small Business Credit Initiative (SSBCI) which
will provide $1.5 billion to state-led programs that support small business
lending. The SSBCI is expected to create $15 billion in incremental
lending.59 Additionally, up to $15 billion was committed by the Treasury to
56 Id.
57 Karen G. Mills, Federal Reserve Board Forum: Addressing the Financing Needs
of Small Businesses, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN. (July 12, 2010),
http://www.sba.gov/administrator/7389/5779.
58 See Small Business Lending Fund, U.S. DEP'T TREASURY (Aug. 25, 2011, 4:01
PM), http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sb-programs/Pages/Small-Business-
Lending-Fund.aspx.
59 See State Small Business Credit Initiative, U.S. DEP'T TREASURY (Sept. 12, 2011,
9:42 AM), http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sb-programs/Pages/ssbci.aspx.
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unlock the secondary markets for small business lending by purchasing
those securities, thus freeing more capital to be re-lent.
2. Decreased demand for financing from small businesses
In addressing weakened demand by small businesses to access
necessary capital, provisions in the legislation also reduced or eliminated
fees for the 7(a) and 504 loan programs. Such elimination of fees de facto
lowered the borrowing costs for small businesses. Jobs Act legislation also
increased the statutory size of SBA loans from $2 to $5 million (and $5.5
million for manufacturers in the 504 loan program). This right-sizing of
loans may also decrease borrower costs as many businesses can now rely on
a single source of financing for their needs.
3. Tightened credit standards/diminished creditworthiness.
In many ways tightening credit standards and diminished
creditworthiness of borrowers represent the same issue in which the gap
between lender standards and borrower capacity must be bridged. In
addressing the capacity of a borrower, the Jobs Act introduced a refinancing
program for 504 loans and also created new size standards that re-define
many as small businesses. Furthermore, the increase in SBA loans
guarantees was also meant to facilitate the easing of credit standards.
Overall, the results significantly increased SBA loan volumes,
subsequently filling a larger part of the gap created by the decline in the
overall small business lending market (see Figures 6 and 7). Since fiscal
2009 when monthly SBA volumes declined to a monthly average of $1.09
billion, including only $684 million in January 2009, the monthly average
has increased by 95% to the current year-to-date fiscal 2011 average (in
July 2011) of $2.12 billion. Furthermore, the secondary market for 7(a)
loans unlocked, increasing by 32% to $434 million from its fiscal 2008
average to fiscal 2011 year-to-date, with over 95% sold at premiums above
106%.
Given the successful results of the SBA, Obama Administration, and
congressional response to a decline in government guaranteed credit, a
question persists-What is the relative strength of each lever used to
support the small business credit market? Consequently, this paper uses
historical data to explore the relative strength of supply and demand side
market factors in predicting small business lending.
IV. SMALL BUSINESS LENDING ANALYSIS
To further understand the causes and implications of stalled credit
markets, this paper explores the one-to-one causal relationships between
2011 Small Business Financing and the
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three independent variables (market factors) and the dependent variable of
small business lending, defined as outstanding commercial loans below $1
million. A path diagram and the model for this theory can be found below:
Figure 8. Study Path Diagram
Lender Oistribution Cnpcity
Lenider~d Cnpa-itV 1 + _____________
Yi = 10 + Lender Distribution Capacity * 11 + Lender Volume Capacity * P2 +
Borrower Capacity * 13 + c
A. Data and Methodology
This analysis utilizes time series data from the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) as well as from the S&P/Case Shiller Home
Price Index. FDIC data is obtained from the Federal Financial Institution
Examination Council (FFIEC) Call Report and the Office of Thrift
Supervision (OTS) Thrift Financial Reports submitted by FDIC insured
depository institution. Currently, all utilized FDIC data is reported
quarterly; however, the key dependent variable, small business lending, was
only reported annually (each June) until March 2010. The S&P/Case-Shiller
Home Price Indices track changes in the value of residential real estate
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nationally by metropolitan area and for indices of the ten and twenty largest
metropolitan areas.6°
To ensure a robust data set, this study uses the composite index of ten
metropolitan areas since the Composite 20 index only began reporting in
January 2000. Although the individual data points for the Composite 20
index would provide a more comprehensive view of changes in the
housing/collateral market, the narrower scope of the composite ten index
should not affect the model. This result is due to the high correlation
between the indices (0.9987 for all available monthly data).
Based on the limited availability of small business lending data, annual
time series data from 1995 to present (March 2011) is used for each
variable. Additionally, each variable uses June data as the annual data point
with the exception of domestic branches (distribution capacity). Accessible
FDIC data only provides branches for December call reports through 2002
and quarterly thereafter. Therefore, for consistency, this variable uses
annual December data for each year.61 Additionally, since June 2011 data is
not yet available, March 2011 data has been used as the 2011 data point for
all variables including branches as the best proxy.
From this, the main data issue potentially facing this analysis is the
small data sample size of seventeen observations for each variable. This
problem should, however, be mitigated as the data covers two economic
cycles with recessionary periods in 2001 and 2008-2009 data.
Small Business Lending (SB Loans): This paper theorizes that
the value of small business loans is causally dependent on
lender distribution capacity, lender volume capacity, and
borrower capacity. The numeric data for this variable
represents the number of domestic loans outstanding less than
$1 million.62
60 S&P/Case-Shiller Metro Area Home Price Indices, STANDARD & POOR'S (May
2006), available at http://www2.standardandpoors.com/spf/pdf/index/
SPCSMetroAreaHomePricesMethodology.pdf. "The S&P/Case-Shiller Home
Price Indices use the 'repeat sales method' of indexcalculation-an approach that is
widely recognized as the premier methodology for indexing housing prices-which
uses data on properties that have sold at least twice, in order to capture the true
appreciated value of each specific sales unit." Id.The main issue that can be caused by this use of June data is the six month (half
a period) lag in branch data. While this may create issues (to be determined later)
the results should be muted as the magnitude of branch changes between periods is
generally lower, averaging an absolute annual change of 1.39% from 1992 to 2010
as opposed to 6.8% for Assets, as a volume capacity proxy, or 10.4% for housing
from 1995 to 2010. Id.
62 FDIC Definition: Amount of currently outstanding loans secured by non-farm,
nonresidential properties with original amounts less than $1 million held in
domestic offices. Note: (1) Institutions report only those loans having original
amounts of less than $1 million (large institutions might have these types of loans
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" Distribution Capacity/Total Branches (Branches): It is
theorized that a positive relationship exists between an increase
in domestic branches and small business lending, since
domestic branches represent physical points of access for the
distribution of small business loans. The numeric variable
branches represent the total domestic offices for all FDIC
insured institutions.6 3
" Volume Capacity 1/Assets (Assets): It is theorized that a
positive relationship exists between an increase in assets and
small business lending, since assets represent resources a bank
can leverage to lend (including cash). The numeric variable
assets represent the total assets held by all FDIC insured
institutions at a given period.64
* Volume Capacity 2/Domestic Deposits (Deposits): It is
theorized that a positive relationship exists between an increase
in domestic deposits and small business lending, since domestic
deposits provide a' capital base for lending activity. The
numeric variable deposits represent the total deposits held in
domestic offices of FDIC insured institutions.6 5
" Volume Capacity 3/Tier 1 Capital (Tier]): It is theorized that
a positive relationship exists between an increase in Tier 1
Capital and small business lending, since Tier 1 capital or core
capital represents a bank's capital adequacy and health. The
numeric variable Tier 1 represents the total Tier 1 capital held
by all FDIC insured banks in a given period.66
but not within this size range); (2) For institutions filing only the total number of
the aforementioned loans with original amounts of less than $100,000, it was
assumed that the total amount of these loans have original amounts of less than
$100,000; (3) Available on a quarterly basis as of 2010. Prior to 2010, reported as
of June 30th only. See Instructions for Preparation of Consolidated Reports of
Condition and Income (FFIEC 031 and 041), FEDERAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
EXAMINATION CouNcIL, RC-C-3 1-RC-C-33 (June 2011), http://www.ffiec.gov/
PDF/FFIEC forms/ffiec031 041 200203 i.pdf.
63 FDIC Definition: The num~ber of domestic offices (including headquarters)
operated by active institutions in the U.S., territories and possessions. See id. at A-
32.
64 FDIC Definition: The sum of all assets owned by the institution including cash,
loans, securities, bank premises and other assets. This total does not include off-
balance-sheet accounts. See id. at RC-D-1.
65 FDIC Definition: The sum of all domestic office deposits, including demand
deposits, money market deposits, other savings deposits and time deposits. See id.
at A- 17-A-25.66 FDIC Definition: Tier 1 (core) capital includes: common equity plus
noncumulative perpetual preferred stock plus minority interests in consolidated
subsidiaries less goodwill and other ineligible intangible assets. 12 C.F.R. §
325.2(v) (2011). The amount of eligible intangibles (including mortgage servicing
OHIO STATE ENTREPRENEURIAL
BUSINESS LA WJOURNAL
Vol. 6:2
* Borrower Capacity/Housing Index (Housing): It is theorized
that a positive relationship exists between an increase in the
aggregate value of housing prices and small business lending
since housing values represent borrower capacity to take on
loans as available collateral. The numeric variable "Housing"
represents the index value for the average change in home
prices for ten major metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs).67
Figure 9. Study Data
Small Business
Lending
SB Loans
$349,839,955,000
$368,280,949,000
$388,826,125,000
$410,849,424,000
$440,478,258,000
$481,914,060,000
$509,369,694,000
$534,971,939,000
$549,197,039,000
$577,321,017,000
$601,479,505,000
$634,189,004,000
$686,759,579,000
$711,452,500,000
$695,225,317,000
$652,247,329,000
$609.415.717.000
Distribution
Capacity
Total
Branches
Branches
81,271
82,626
83,891
84,907
86,426
86,333
86,954
87,929
89,250
91,875
94,177
96,850
99,183
100,613
100,056
99,136
99.078
Volume Capacity
Assets
Assets
$5,189,722,395,000
$5,422,795,511,000
$5,803,460,852,000
$6,229,498,743,000
$6,594,814,760,000
$7,163,614,418,000
$7,635,923,679,000
$8,039,006,629,000
$8,923,262,177,000
$9,648,544,817,000
$10,474,368,258,000
$11,526,114,005,000
$12,261,370,672,000
$13,300,432,661,000
$13,279,680,853,000
$13,199,820,479,000
$13,414,655,013.000
Domestic Deposits
Deposits
$3,212,368,189,000
$3,327,065,368,000
$3,494,289,801,000
$3,660,317,196,000
$3,785,889,167,000
$4,004,448,986,000
$4,337,938,627,000
$4,613,275,852,000
$5,171,805,488,000
$5,462,524,945,000
$5,925,885,076,000
$6,436,719,019,000
$6,692,011,085,000
$7,029,159,146,000
$7,555,212,681,000
$7,667,714,922,000
$7.990505.750.000
Tier I Capital
Tier]
$390,983,662,500
$414,187,675,750
$438,365,439,350
$468,986,287,200
$503,079,973,350
$541,748,714,450
$577,502,971,500
$621,277,860,000
$671,946,768,000
$751,202,872,000
$831,461,334,000
$915,633,505,000
$967,387,819,000
$1,014,365,369,000
$1,081,487,594,000
$1,131,935,965,000
$1,187,350,623,000
B. Correlation
A correlation analysis for the six variables was run. From these
correlations, it is manifest that all independent variables are correlated to
some extent to the dependent variable, small business lending. The most
notable correlations are between Branches-Assets, Deposits-Assets, Tier]-
Assets, and Tier]l-Deposits, which were 0.994, 0.993, 0.992, and 0.999.
This high correlation, particularly between the combinations of Assets,
Date
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
Borrower
Capacity
Housing
Index
Housing
76.66
77.47
79.91
86.63
94.65
107.34
119.50
132.22
149.13
178.83
208.21
225.70
216.88
rights) included in core capital is limited in accordance with supervisory capital
regulations.
67 S&P/Case-Shiller Metro Area Home Price Indices, supra note 60.
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Deposits, and Tier] make intuitive sense, as they are all proxies for a
bank's volume capacity.
Therefore, additional tests through combinations of all possible
regressions need to be run to identify which independent variable best
represents volume capacity for this model. Additionally, it should be noted
that the correlation between Housing and all variables, though still strong,
is relatively weak compared to those between all other independent
variables, ranging from 0.765 to 0.829.
Figure 10. Correlation Table
SB Loans Branches Assets Deposits Tier] Housing
SB Loans 1.000
Branches 0.966 1.000
Assets 0.960 0.994 1.000
Deposits 0.929 0.979 0.993 1.000
Tier] 0.922 0.978 0.992 0.999 1.000
Housing 0.876 0.829 0.809 0.773 0.765 1.000
These correlations may also be used as a check for severe
multicollinearity in the data, a strong correlation between independent
variables. 68 In this instance, there does appear to be severe multicollinearity,
which exists in eight of ten independent variable combinations (Branches-
Assets; Branches-Deposits; Branches-Tier] ; Assets-Deposits; Assets-Tier] ;
Deposits-Tier]; Branches-Housing, and Housing-Assets). If this
multicollinearity appears to affect the regression results, the effect can be
tested and quantified through a variance inflation factor.
C. Multiple Linear Regression Analysis
In order to estimate the best model for small business lending and
assuming that the model is linear, all combinations of independent variable
regressions were run, with no more than one volume capacity variable used
at any point. The purpose of the fifteen regression combinations is to:
68 The existence of such multicollinearity, generally noted as a correlation greater
than 0.8 between independent variables, may increase the variances and standard
error estimates, will cause t-scores to fall, and will cause the estimates to become
sensitive to changes in specification. It will not, however, affect the adjusted R2, or
overall fit of the estate equation.
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a) Identify the best volume capacity variable for a small business
lending regression between Assets, Domestic Deposits, and
Tier 1 Capital.
b) Test the relationship between the three identified independent
variables-Distribution Capacity, Volume Capacity, and
Borrower Capacity-against the dependent variable small
business lending to identify the relative strength of each as a
lever to spur small business lending.
Small Business Financing and the
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Fit of Regression Model
1. R2 Analysis
In identifying the best fit equation, thirteen of the fifteen regression
combinations had a relatively high R2, above 0.900.69 Adjusted R2, unlike
regular R2 accounts for the number of independent variables (and increases
if an incremental variable improves fit). The same thirteen regression
combinations with a high R2 also had a high adjusted R2. Among those,
five were extremely high, an R2 greater than 0.950, including Branches-
Housing-Assets, Branches-Housing-Deposits, Branches-Housing-Tier 1,
Branches-Housing and Housing-Assets. The highest R2, at 0.955, was
found in test 3 for Branches-Housing-Tier 1.
From this R2 analysis it is clear that a model using any of the capacity
variables (Assets, Deposits, or Tierl) could sufficiently estimate small
business lending. If looking exclusively at which capacity variable creates
the highest R2, in combination with Branches and Housing, then Tier 1
Capital (Tierl) should be selected. However, R2 only measures the fit of
the overall equation and not individual components (or coefficients).
Therefore, additional analysis, including an F-Test on the equation, and
individual analyses of the variable coefficients must be run.
2. F-Test.
Next, in examining the overall fit of the regression, the F test is observed,
which tests the statistical significance of the regression model.70 In this
instance, all fifteen of the regression combinations have a relatively robust F
statistics and a F significance at the 95% level. As such, this test confirms the
validity of the models, but provides limited insight into the best fit of the
combinations, namely in identifying the best volume capacity proxy.
Fit of Variables
Lastly, in looking at the output for the individual independent
variables---coefficients, t-statistics, and p-values-much can be determined.
Overall, the most significant trend among all of the regressions is the
relative size and impact of the coefficients for Branches and Housing as
compared to all three for volume capacity (Assets; Deposits; and Tier1).
This pattern is consistent in all fifteen regressions. Furthermore, in
69 R2, the coefficient of determination, is the ratio of the explained sum of squared
to the total sum of squares, explaining how well the regression line approximates
the real data-thus, the higher the R2, the more the estimated regression equation
fits the data.
70 The F-Test indicates the extent to which the regression results could be by
chance. Therefore, the more robust the F statistic and the lower an F significance
factor, the more statistically significant a result is, thus confirming the validity of a
given regression.
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examining the t-statistics and p-values to identify a model with statistically
significant coefficients, an interesting trend emerges:
Volume Capacity-Distribution Capacity-Borrower Capacity
Models: Among the three models that utilize all three types of independent
variables, no combination yields result with all coefficients statistically
significant (i.e., p-values) at the 90% or 95% level. Only Branches-
Housing-Deposits yields two, with Deposits strongly insignificant (p-value
= 0.524) and with a counterintuitive negative coefficient. Furthermore, in
each of these instances only housing has consistently robust t-statistics.
Combination of two models: Among the seven models that test all
combinations of two for the independent variables, using no more than one
volume capacity variable in each, four combinations had results with
statistically significant p-values at the 95% level (Branches-Housing;
Housing-Assets; Housing-Deposits; Housing-Tierl) and one with
significance at the 90% level (Branches-Tier]). In the Branches-Tier]
instance, the coefficient was also negative, counter to the hypothesized
relationship to small business lending. In these instances, however, the
majority of the t-statistics, with the exception of Assets in Branches-Assets
were significantly large.
Individual Regressions: Lastly, among the five individual regressions
for each independent variable against small business lending each had
highly significant p-values and robust t-statistics.
D. Best Fit Model
Based on this analysis of fifteen regressions it is evident that several
models would be sufficient to estimate small business lending. Nonetheless,
for the purposes of this paper, test 2 (Branches-Housing-Deposits) was
selected as the best fit model for further examination. This model was
chosen for three distinct reasons:
* Completeness. This test, in addition to tests 1 and 3, each use
both supply variables (distribution and volume) as well as a
demand variable (borrower capacity).
" Overall Fit. The overall fit of test 2 was very high, with an R
2
0.953, an adjusted R2 of 0.942, a robust F statistic of 87.31, and
a high F-significance of 0.000000005.
" More significant coefficients. Of the complete models, test 2
is the only one in which 2 of the 3 independent variable
coefficients are statistically significant (p-value < 0.05). In test
1 and test 2, only one variable coefficient is significant. Test 2
also has more robust t-statistics for each of the independent
variable coefficients than the other models.
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Deposits, the volume capacity variable, is the statistically insignificant
variable in test 2 and has a negative coefficient (-0.015), which is counter to
the hypothesized positive relationship with small business lending. The
small magnitude of the Deposit coefficient suggests that it has very little
impact on small business lending (further explaining the high RE even
though the coefficient is statistically insignificant). This is confirmed by
test 14, an independent regression of Deposits on SBLending. In test 14,
Deposits had an R2 of 0.862, a strong F significance (0.0000), robust t-
statistic, and a very low p-value. Furthermore, the coefficient was also
extremely small (0.066 in test 14 vs. -0.0416 in test 2).
Figure 12. Regression Results (Branches - Housing - Deposits)
Regression Statistics
0.97607060
Multiple R 7
R Square 0.95271383
Adjusted R 0.94180163
Square 7
Standard 286696529
Error 65
Observatio
ns 17
ANOVA
Significanc
df SS MS F e F
2.15286E+ 7.17621E+ 87.307273 7.23496E-
Regression 3 23 22 96 09
1.06853E+ 8.21949E+
Residual 13 22 20
2.25972E+
Total 16 23
Coefficient Standard
s Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95%
1.02618E+ 4.28048E+ 2.39734031 0.0322451 1.95092E+ 1.01435E+
Intercept 12 11 5 29 12 11
17243720.2 6152763.23 0.0149551 3951483.39 30535957.0
Branches 2 9 2.80259772 72 9 5
509531390. 272176572. 1.87206189 0.0838642 78470345.3 109753312
Housing 4 8 4 28 2 6
- 0.02222056 0.65434691 0.5242963 0.06254457 0.03346465
Deposits 0.01453996 8 7 27 8 8
Using the estimated coefficients and t-statistics, the regression equation was found
and the dependent variable predicted.
SB Lending = -1,026,175,881,445.8 + 17,243,720.2 * Branches + 509,531,390.4 * Housing + -
0.015 * Deposits
t-statistic 4 (-2.397)
(-0.654)
(2.802) (1.872)
2011 Small Business Financing and the 439
Post-2008 Credit Paradigm
The multivariate regression coefficients, which are similar in nature to a
partial derivative, isolate the impact of each independent variable on the
dependent variable small business lending. Thus, holding constant the
influence of other variables in the equation, the influence of each
independent variable on the dependent variable is clear. Although Deposits,
which represents domestic deposits, is the best-fit variable to capture
volume capacity based on the overall model, it has a relatively small
coefficient hovering close to zero, at -0.015, and can be characterized as
statistically undetermined. The coefficient also has a relatively small t-
statistic and insignificant p-value. This finding suggests a small impact
between a change in a bank's Deposits and its small business lending. An
increase in Deposits leading to a small decrease in small business lending,
as suggested by this model, is opposite of the intuitive assumption that
Deposits are positively correlated with small business lending. As
previously mentioned, the causes for this potential error could come from a
variety of sources including (a) an unaccounted time lag between changes
in the independent variable and its effects on the dependent variable, or (b)
a lack of robust time-series data. In this instance, both may be true.
Throughout the limited periods observed, Domestic Deposits
continually increased both as small business lending increased from 2003-
2008 and when it decreased from 2008 onward. This trend makes sense as
Deposits both grew naturally during the non-recessionary period as well as
during the credit crunch since banks often sought deposits as sources of
necessary liquidity and capitalization. This non-intuitive sign may also be a
symptom of the observed multicollinearity. However, that would also have
manifested with swings in the variable magnitude, which have been
consistently small-about zero (see test 14). Therefore, the key take away
from the regression output for Deposits is the magnitude, which hovers near
zero indicating a mitigated impact.
Conversely, Branches, which captures distribution capacity, has a
relatively high and statistically significant coefficient (17,243,720.2) and a
robust t-statistic. Holding all else constant, this fact suggests that each
incremental bank branch would increase small business lending by $17
million.
Housing, the borrower capacity variable, also has a relatively large and
statistically significant coefficient (509,531,390.4) and robust t-statistic.
Holding all else equal, this data suggests that a one-point increase in the
S&P/Case Shiller Composite 10 Index, meaning an increase in home
values, would increase borrower capacity by an incremental $509 million. It
should be noted that the above analysis assumes constant demand based on
one's capacity.
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1. Residual Output
In analyzing the model residuals, the difference between the actual
SBLending values and the estimated SBLending values, much is evident.
Figure 13. Residual Analysis Data
SB Lending SB Lending
Observation (Actual) (Predicted) Residuals Standard Residuals$
1 $ 349,839,955,000 $ 375,271,704,215 $ (25,431,749,215) (0.98)$
2 $ 368,280,949,000 $ 388,803,122,352 $ (20,522,173,352) (0.79)$
3 $ 388,826,125,000 $ 404,577,362,026 $ (15,751,237,026) (0.61)$
4 $ 410,849,424,000 $ 421,696,037,219 $ (10,846,613,219) (0.42)$
5 $ 440,478,258,000 $ 442,527,983,234 $ (2,049,725,234) (0.08)$
6 $ 481,914,060,000 $ 456,929,600,608 $ 24,984,459,392 0.96$
7 $ 509,369,694,000 $ 475,028,872,692 $ 34,340,821,308 1.33$
8 $ 534,971,939,000 $ 495,181,794,051 $ 39,790,144,949 1.54$
9 $ 549,197,039,000 $ 526,688,574,146 $ 22,508,464,854 0.87$
10 $ 577,321,017,000 $ 573,509,515,711 $ 3,811,501,289 0.15$
11 $ 601,479,505,000 $ 619,058,563,480 $ (17,579,058,480) (0.68)$
12 $634,189,004,000 $ 663,082,117,342 $ (28,893,113,342) (1.12)$
13 $ 686,759,579,000 $ 684,534,769,560 $ 2,224,809,440 0.09$
14 $ 711,452,500,000 $ 686,363,370,569 $ 25,089,129,431 0.97$
15 $ 695,225,317,000 $ 665,545,788,046 $ 29,679,528,954 1.15$
16 $652,247,329,000 $ 662,358,980,567 $ (10,111,651,567) (0.39)$
17 $ 609,415,717,000 $ 660,659,255,181 $ (51,243,538,181) (1.98)
Firstly, in plotting a histogram of the standard residuals, the distribution
approximates normal, indicating the relative strength of the overall model.
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Figure 14. Standard Residuals
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However, when plotting the predicted SBLending variables against the
actual SBLending variables, a non-randomized trend emerges that indicates
potential autocorrelation of the data.
Figure 15. Scatterplot & Data - Predicted vs. Actual Small Business Lending
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This potential autocorrelation is further confirmed by observing the
residuals for each of the independent variables. Although there is fair
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dispersion of the residuals around zero, the assumption is that the sum of
errors is zero and is not related. The residuals are clearly related and
patterned in a way that suggests positive autocorrelation between error
terms.
Figure 16. Residual
Plots
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E. A utocorrelation
Given the evidence of potential autocorrelation, in the data, several
tactics can be taken to further detect such serial correlation and create
remedies for the model.
Durbin-Watson Statistic. Using the Durbin-Watson test, first order
serial correlation in the time series regression can be identified. For a study
with seventeen observations and three independent variables, upper and
lower limits of the Durbin-Watson statistic are 1.432 and 0.672
respectively. And in solving for the Durbin Watson statistic, using the
residuals from this model, a value of 0.654 is found (please see APPENDIX
for calculation). With a Durbin Watson statistic of 0.654 there is evidence
of positive autocorrelation.
Figure 17. Durbin Watson Test
Evidence of Indecision No Autocorrelation Indecision Evidence of
Possible Possible
Autocorrelatio Autocorrelation
n
DW Statistic
(0.654)
0.672 1.432 2 2.569 3.328
(dL) (dU) (4-dU) (4-dL)
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As such, errors associated with a given time period in this model affect
predictions in future periods. This phenomenon manifests by
underestimating standard errors and inflating t-statistics. This
autocorrelation can be caused by a myriad of factors including business
cycles, specification bias (of variable or form) and data lags, among others.
F. Analysis Results
This study set out to examine the causal relationship between
independent variables for a bank's volume capacity, distribution capacity,
and a borrower's capacity on the dependent variable of small business
lending. Overall the evidence across fifteen regressions is consistent that a
strong positive relationship does exist between distribution capacity and
borrower capacity-with a relatively weaker (mainly positive) relationship
existing with volume capacity.
Intuitively, for statistically significant positive volume capacity
instances (i.e., tests 13-15), these results make sense as volume capacity for
all three proxies is purely a gating factor (albeit a vital one). A bank must
have appropriate capitalization to be able to lend (i.e., the gate), but
increased capitalization may not in and of itself lead to increased lending.
Furthermore, distribution capacity or points of access via branches are
specifically necessary to lend small business dollars (and assuming constant
borrower demand), as Borrower Capacity increases a borrower will
capitalize on their higher valued collateral to consistently take on more
debt.
Nonetheless, this model does have limitations that require future study.
* More Robust Data. More robust time-series data is vital to
further explore the factors that affect small business lending.
Going forward this data will be available given FDIC's move
to report outstanding loans by size quarterly in 2010, as well as
the future reporting of actual demand side data (applications,
rejections, etc.) to the Consumer Finance Protection Bureau as
mandated by Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act of 201071 (Dodd-Frank). Until such data is
available, however, studies based on limited data should be
mainly leverage for their directional findings and insights.
" Autocorrelation errors. An issue that often emerges in time-
series data, as in this model, is one of auto-correlation in which
errors in estimation from one period carry over to another.
Future studies should look to assess fixes to this problem such
as the Cochrane-Orcutt Estimation. One limitation of the
7 Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
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Cochrane-Orcutt estimation, as with any fix of potential lagged
endogenous variables, is the loss of a time-period. In low data
observation (i.e., low n) instances such as this study, such data
loss could create additional externalities.
Despite these model limitations, which affect the errors, clear
directional relationships between independent variables for lender volume
capacity, lender distribution capacity, and borrower capacity, are manifest.
From a government loan guaranty perspective, therefore, the impact of each
incremental branch and points of access is of prime importance.
V. CONCLUSION
From this study the importance of lender volume capacity, lender
distribution capacity and borrower capacity to small business lending is
clear; however, each affect the small business lending market at distinct
magnitudes. Volume capacity has a much lower delta for changes in small
business lending and appears to serve mainly as a gating variable for
banks-a bank must be properly capitalized to lend (i.e., the gate).
However, a strong causal relationship does not exist in which increased
capital itself drives lending. As such, vital Administration efforts to support
the capitalization of banks were imperative to allow additional programs to
specifically move the needle on small business lending. Conversely,
distribution capacity, or branches, and borrower capacity, or collateral
value, have a strong causal relationship and large direct impact on small
business lending.
The importance ofpoints of access
Specific to government support and the analysis found in this paper,
increased distribution capacity (working parallel to other initiatives) is
imperative. Increased points of access is vital to augmenting small business
support and capitalizing changes in the overall credit market such as easing
credit standards or programmatic innovations like the Recovery Act and the
Jobs Act provisions.
Evidence proves that increasing points of access have been a
commitment of the U.S. Small Business Administration since the outset of
the credit crunch, where over 1200 new lenders have been recruited and are
active in the 7(a) program since passage of the Recovery Act in February
2009. Additionally, the government has launched new loan programs that
extend the government 7(a) guaranty to non-bank mission based lenders
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such as Community Development Financial Institutions (CDFIs), Certified
Development Companies (CDCs), and microlender intermediaries.72
A framework to increase points of access in order to reach small
businesses and increase lending must look both at the branch level (as
examined in the above analysis) as well as lender, or institution level.
Figure 18. Bank Branches vs. Active FDIC Insured Institutions
December 1992 to December 2010
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Although the number of branches, defined as domestic offices, has
grown by 21.7% since 1992, the number of unique FDIC insured
institutions has decreased by 45. 1%.73 The effects of such institutional
consolidation on small business lending itself are contested and must be
examined further. Some literature argues that the consolidation of smaller
72 Specifically, the SBA Community Advantage program launched in February
2011 provides 7(a) authority to mission based lenders for loans up to $250,000
with an 85% guaranty below $150,000 and 75% up to $250,000. Advantage Loan
Initiatives, SBA.Gov, http://www.sba.gov/advantage (last visited Sept. 15, 2011).
73 FDIC Statistics on Depository Institutions (SDI),
http://www2.fdic.gov/sdi/main.asp. Unique Institutions are defined as Unique
FDIC Certificate # and/or Institution name in FDIC Call Report data for a given
time period.
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or focused lenders actually increases small business credit availability.74
Others note that in areas where competition is reduced, the impact is
adverse.75 A fundamental understanding of these implications is necessary
for strategic outreach and program design for future government support
initiatives.
In conclusion, small businesses represent a vital component of the
American economy. Half of all Americans work for a small business and
over 99% of all firms are small. 76 Furthermore, these firms are especially
sensitive to changes in the credit markets since a majority of small
businesses rely on banks for their financing needs.77 As a result, during
periods of frozen credit markets, government programs are often enacted to
support increased small business lending and decrease frictions in the
market. As evidenced by this study (see Section IV), physical points of
access are a key driver in increasing small business lending and taking
advantage of critical government programs. Therefore, it is imperative that
any government response to a credit crisis, much like that in 2008, includes
a strategic effort to increase lending institution participation (i.e., points of
access).
74 Joe Peek & Eric S. Rosengren, Bank Consolidation and Small Business Lending:
It's Not Just Size That Matters, 22 J. BANKING & FIN.799 (1998).
75 Charles Ou, Banking Consolidation and Small Business Lending: A Review of
Recent Research, SBA OFFICE OF ADVOCACY (Mar. 2005), available at
http://archive.sba.gov/advo/research/ wkp05ou.pdf.
76Employment Size of Employer and Nonemployer Firms, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU
(2008), available at http://www.census.gov/econ/smallbus.html.
7 68% of firms cite at least one bank credit product as their top three sources of
financing. Access to Credit: Poll Evidence from Small Businesses, COMMUNITY
AFFAIRS OFFICE, FED. RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK, 3 FACTS & TRENDS No. 2
(October 2010).
APPENDIX
A1. Regression Analysis
Regression Test 1. Branches - Housing - Assets
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.975962362
R Square 0.952502532
Adjusted R
Square 0.941541578
Standard Error 28733636605
Observations 17
ANOVA
Significance
Df SS MS F F
Regression 3 2.15239E+23 7.17462E+22 86.89960045 7.44699E-09
Residual 13 1.07331E+22 8.25622E+20
Total 16 2.25972E+23
Standard
Coefficients Error tStat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95%
Intercept 3.38999E+11 7.11899E+1 1 -0.476190263 0.641842367 -1.87696E+12 1.19896E+12
Branches 7386520.12 10102424.25 0.731163129 0.477652283 -14438440.53 29211480.77
Housing 605949369.8 264394660.1 2.291836641 0.039248625 34759434.22 1177139305
Assets 0.013008211 0.021430792 0.60698696 0.554313372 -0.0332902 0.059306623
Regression Test 2. Branches-Housing-Deposits
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.976070607
R Square 0.95271383
Adjusted R
Square 0.941801637
Standard
Error 28669652965
Observations 17
ANOVA
Significance
Df SS MS F F
Regression 3 2.15286E+23 7.17621E+22 87.30727396 7.23496E-09
Residual 13 1.06853E+22 8.21949E+20
Total 16 2.25972E+23
Standard
Coefficients Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95%
Intercept -1.02618E+12 4.28048E+1 1 -2.397340315 0.032245129 -1.95092E+12 1.01435E+1 1
Branches 17243720.22 6152763.239 2.80259772 0.014955172 3951483.399 30535957.05
Housing 509531390.4 272176572.8 1.872061894 0.083864228 -78470345.32 1097533126
Deposits -0.01453996 0.022220568 -0.654346917 0.524296327 -0.062544578 0.033464658
OHIO STATE ENTREPRENEURIAL
BUSINESS LA WJOURNAL
Vol. 6:2
2011 Small Business Financing and the
Post-2008 Credit Paradigm
Regression Test 3. Branches-Housing-Tierl
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.977288445
R Square 0.955092704
Adjusted R
Square 0.944729482
Standard Error 27939190416
Observations 17
Regression
Residual
Total
3 2.15824E+23 7.19413E+22 92.16175221 5.17834E-09
13 1.01478E+22 7.80598E+20
16 2.25972E+23
Standard
Coefficients Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95%
Intercept 1.22071E+12 4.51612E+11 2.703001099 0.018090144 2.19636E+12 -2.4506E+11
Branches 19796521.63 6257089.202 3.163854788 0.007469711 6278902.262 33314141
Housing 451473411.6 273204678.2 1.652509812 0.12236466 -138749410.9 1041696234
Tier1 0.145954727 0.136729091 1.067473833 0.305180832 -0.441339968 0.149430515
Regression Test 4. Branches-Assets
Regression Statisti cs
Multiple R 0.966080573
R Square 0.933311673
Adjusted R
Square 0 923784769
Standard Error 32808617955
Observations 17
ANOVA
Significance
df -SS MS F F
Regression 2 2.10902E+23 1.05451E+23 97.96589591 5.86609E-09
Residual 14 1.50697E+22 1.07641E+21
Total 16 2.25972E+23
Standard
Coefficients Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95 %
Intercept 9.45655E+11 7.54579E+11 1.253222045 0,230651655 2.56407E+12 6.72756E+11
Branches 16134675.26 10680055.28 1.510729563 0.153095675 6771765.071 39041115.58
Assets 0.001646093 0.02380633 0.069145172 0.945851978 0.049413407 0.052705593
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Regression Test 5. Branches-Deposits
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.969518514
R Square 0.939966149
Adjusted R
Square 0.931389884
Standard Error 31128710242
Observations 17
ANOVA
Significance
df SS ms F F
Regression 2 2.12406E+23 1.06203E+23 109.6008821 2.81043E-09
Residual 14 1.3566E+22 9.68997E+20
Total 16 2.25972E+23
Standard
Coefficients Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95%
Intercept 1.46478E+12 3.88964E+11 -3.76583836 0.002087007 2.29902E+12 6.30531E+11
Branches 23648596.35 5552451.797 4.259126818 0.000793968 11739771.69 35557421.01
Deposits 0.028388945 0.022750163 1.247856778 0.232552146 -0.07718319 0.020405301
Regression Test 6. Branches-Tier1
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.972450229
R Square 0.945659448
Adjusted R
Square 0.937896512
Standard Error 29615907722
Observations 17
ANOVA
Significance
df SS MS F F
Regression 2 2.13692E+23 1.06846E+23 121.817241 1.39916E-09
Residual 14 1.22794E+22 8.77102E420
Total 16 2.25972E+23
Standard
Coefficients Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95%
Intercept 1.66264E+12 3.85755E+1 1 4.310103055 0.000719349 -2.49E+12 8.35281 E+1 I
Branches 26074367.57 5270188.843 4.947520544 0.000214435 14770936.73 37377798.41
Tier1 0.236871767 0.132683468 1.785239496 0.095896397 0.521449501 0.047705967
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Regression Test 7. Branches-Housing
Re ression Statistics
Multiple R 0.975272478
R Square 0.951156406
Adjusted R
Square 0.94417875
Standard Error 28078042803
Observations 17
ANOVA
Significance
fSs MS F F
Regression 2 2.14934E+23 1.07467E+23 136.3145968 6.63213E-10
Residual 14 1.10373E+22 7.88376E+20
Total 16 2.25972E+23
Intercept
Branches
Housing
Standard
Coefificints Error
7.62234E+1 1 1.40293E+1 1
13410700.55 1843423.261
568824112.1 251354001.2
tStat P-value Lower 95%, Upper35%
5.433176364 8.81865E-05 1.06313E+12 4.61337E+1 1
7.274889515 4.06421E-06 9456950.894 17364450.21
2.263039814 0.040056049 29723398.17 1107924826
Regression Test 8. Housing-Assets
Multiple R 0.974961175
R Square 0.950549292
Adjusted R Square 0.943484905
Standard Error 28252005492
Observations 17
ANOVA
Significance
SS MS F
Regression 2 2.14797E+23 1.07399E+23 134.5551015 7.23115E-10
Residual 14 1.11745E+22 7.98176E+20
Total 16 2.25972E+23
Intercept
Housing
Assets
Coefficients
1.81234E+11
678991625.6
0.028402
Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95%
23001382874 7.879254896 1.63395E-06 1.31901 E+1 1 2.30567E+11
240692148.4 2.820996156 0.013606005 162758311.3 1195224940
0.003934777 7.218197908 4.43751E-06 0.019962742 0.036841258
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Rearession Test 9. Housing-Deposits
Rgression Statistics
Multiple R 0.961323927
R Square 0.924143694
Adjusted R Square 0.913307078
Standard Error 34991202786
Observations 17
ANOVA
Significance
.. S..ms.. F
Regression 2 2.0883E+23 1.04415E+23 85.27973684 1.44525E-08
Residual 14 1.71414E+22 1.22438E+21
Total 16 2.25972E+23
Standard
Coefficients Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95%
Intercept 1.71534E+1 1 29662057818 5.782953818 4.74248E-05 1.07916E+1 1 2.35153E+1,1
Housing 933693463.9 276097884.4 3.381747984 0.004472364 341522398.8 1525864529
Deposits 0.044749664 0.008296636 5.393711746 9.46788E-05 0.026955149 0.062544179
Regression Test 10. Housing-TierI
Regreionl Statistics
Multiple R 0.959434295
R Square 0.920514166
Adjusted R Square 0.909159047
Standard Error 35818541115
Observations 17
ANOVA
Significance
df SS MS F F
Regression 2 2.0801 E+23 1.04005E+23 81.06600659 2.0046E-08
Residual 14 1.79616E+22 1.28297E+21
Total 16 2.25972E+23
Standard
Coefficients Error t Stat P-sealue Lower 95% Upper 95%
Intercept 2.06469E+11 27886536736 7.403891877 3.33281E-06 1.46658E+11 2.6628E+11
Housing 976279584.5 278307434.2 3.507917736 0.00348002 379369506.3 1573189663
Tier1 0.267630131 0.05138717 5,208111847 0.000132605 0.157415612 0.377844649
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Regression Test 11. Branches
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.966068786
R Square 0.933288899
Adjusted R Square 0.928841492
Standard Error 31701547936
Observations 17
ANOVA
Significance
Df S3 MS F F
Regression I 2.10897E+23 2.10897E+23 209.8501326 3.17197E-10
Residual 15 1.50748E+22 1.00499E+21
Total 16 2.25972E+23
Standard
Coefficients Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95%
Intercept 9.97272E+11 1.06486E+11 9.365263432 1.17575E-07 1.22424E+12 7.70302E+11
Branches 16868433.2 1164448.06 14.48620491 3.17197E-10 14386470.92 19350395.48
Regression Test 12. Housing
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.875507626
R Square 0.766513604
Adjusted R Square 0.750947844
Standard Error 59307853230
Observations 17
ANOVA
Significance
Df SS MS F F
Regression 1 1.7321E+23 1.7321E+23 49.24357155 4.15783E-06
Residual 15 5.27613E+22 351742E+21
Total 16 2.25972E+23
Standard
Coefficients Error t Stat P-t'aiue Lower 95% .Upper 95%
Intercept 2.46883E+11 44350442473 5.56664913 5.39009E-05 1.52353E+11 3.41414E+11
Housing 2084430258 297038400 7.017376401 4.15783E-06 1451307898 2717552618
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Regression Test 13. Assets
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.960437415
R Square 0.922440028
Adjusted R Square 0.917269364
Standard Error 34182217547
Observations 17
ANOVA
Significance
cif Ss MS F F
Regression 1 2.08445E+23 2.08445E+23 178.3987299 9.87074E-10
Residual 15 1.75264E+22 1.16842E+21
Total 16 2.25972E+23
Standard
Coe~fficients Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper %
Intercept 1.93621 E+1 1 27317602932 7.08779062 3.69857E-06 1.35395E+11 2.51848E+11
Assets 0.037381328 0.002798716 13.35659874 9.87074E-10 0.031416005 0.04334665
Regression Test 14. Deposits
Regresson Statistics
Multiple R 0.928535804
R Square 0.862178739
Adjusted R Square 0.852990655
Standard Error 45565854917
Observations 17
ANOVA
Significance
Of SS MS F F
Regression 1 1.94828E+23 1.94828E+23 93.83661832 7.58109E-08
Residual 15 3.11437E+22 2.07625E+21
Total 16 2.25972E+23
Standard
Coefficients Error t Siat P.-Value Lower 95% Upper 95%
Intercept 1.8816E+1 1 38091959151 4.939621669 0.000178064 1.06969E+1 1 2.69351 E+ 11
Deposits 0.066430123 0.006857706 9.686930283 7.58109E-08 0.051813268 0.081046978
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Regression Test 15. Tier 1
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.922306365
R Square 0.850649031
Adjusted R Square 0.8406923
Standard Error 47433528847
Observations 17
ANOVA
Significance
Of $5 - MS F F
Regression 1 1.92223E+23 1.92223E+23 85.43456766 1.39302E-07
Residual 15 3.37491E+22 2.24994E+21
Total 16 2.25972E+23
i Standard
Coefficients Error t Stat
2.42949E+1 1 34265436410 7.090214122
0.40544555 0.043864757 9.243082151
Intercept
Tierd
P-value Lower 95% Upper 95%
3.68375E-06 1.69914E+1 1 3.15984E+1 1
1.39302E-07 0.311950034 0.498941065
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B. Durbin- Watson Test
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